. On constitutionalism, see Michael W. Dowdle, "The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People's Congress," Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 1997) , pp. 1-125.
2 of this entirely. Many passages, especially in Xia's book, detail the most exciting (but perhaps least representative) episodes of contestation, muscularity in lawmaking, and vigorous oversight to be found. The significance of events such as vetoing a court work report (the "Shenyang Incident") or interpellating and then refusing to ratify several bureau directors (the "Guangdong Phenomena") (Cho, pp. 1-2) can at times be difficult to evaluate and a feeling lingers that atypical occurrences (and unusually hardworking congresses) have been blown up beyond their import. 2 That said, both authors have assembled convincing evidence that LPCs are more active than previously thought and that many are closer to the center of power locally than the National People's Congress (NPC) is in Beijing (Cho, p. 163; Xia, p. 250 ).
3
At a time when the NPC often appears sleepy and handcuffed, the most enterprising local congresses introduce innovations that begin in the provinces and spread outwards.
Formerly quiet LPCs emulate dynamic neighbors and policy diffusion occurs on issues including nationalities' autonomy, consumer rights, and the protection of children (Xia, Cho, pp. 15, 165) Provincial congresses, especially, have filled a void created by too few national laws promoting economic liberalization (Xia, p. 5), such that by the late 1990s, legislators in Shanghai and Shenzhen were heard bragging how 2 Both authors are aware of this danger. Cho (p. 15) explicitly acknowledges that the congresses he examines in Shanghai an Guangdong are "pioneers and possible models" and that "we need to be careful about generalizing these cases." advanced their congresses were compared to the NPC, both in terms of top-notch staff and an ability to enact controversial laws. 4 Still, legislative activism remains uneven, among and within provinces (Cho, p. 5).
5
In the absence of a nationwide sample (or armies of scholars studying people's congresses) Cho offers a number of useful hypotheses about variation and how to understand it. Future researchers will want to confirm (or contest) his suggestion that LPCs are more active in poorer than richer urban districts, in coastal than inland provinces, and that leadership, above all, determines whether a congress takes its work seriously (p. 15; chap. 7).
6
Cho also proposes several typologies that will attract attention: LPCs can be divided into pioneers, bandwagoners, and inactives (p. 53).
Deputies may be thought of as policy-providers, supervisors, reflectors, or exemplars, 
Lawmaking
In the 1980s, laws were typically enacted after a period of gathering experience (Xia, p. 157; Cho, p. 27) . Reforms were implemented first through policies, and only later "actively but prudently" transformed into law.
9
In the early 1990s, a new practice emerged. The principle of "lawmaking in advance" encouraged LPCs to step into areas not legislated by the Center, rather than waiting for extensive experience and just the right moment (Cho, p. 27 ). This approach relied on creating test points that preceded national legislation and using local statutes to launch reforms. Xia's findings rest on a careful reading of Chinese sources, including document collections published by people's congresses and provincial yearbooks, as well as interviews with deputies and staff members from six provincial-level congresses. Cho consulted similar written materials and also conducted interviews with legislative leaders, staff, and government officials in Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangdong. To examine factors that led to uneven legislative development, Cho gathered data on eighteen district and county congresses in Tianjin. Its result was a boom in legislating that put over 8100 local statutes on the books by the mid-2000s.
12
Most of these laws concern the economy, in particular market creation and regulation (Xia, chap. 6). A large majority, as in other countries, were drafted by the government. On local lawmaking, Cho and Xia paint a picture of a pluralized policy process in which the interests of Party committees and government departments do not have the impact they once had. Multiple players have opportunities for input as a bill shuttles between organizations, and bargaining and clashes occur, but the dominant pattern is one of "active consultation, voluntary cooperation, and intentional pre-emption of conflict" (Xia, p. 174). Outright winners or losers are uncommon (Cho, p. 41) and the job of LPCs is not to compete with the government or Party, but to prevent policy from being made unilaterally and to provide an arena for hammering out compromises.
Oversight

14
See also Paler, "China's Legislation Law," pp. 310-18. Although hearings are mentioned in the procedural rules of each provincial congress, practices vary on whom to invite, whether advance approval is required, and how to incorporate suggestions into legislation.
Because it rubs up against the Party's nomenklatura power and leads to friction with officials who wish to avoid disclosure of poor performance or misconduct, oversight is often a tougher assignment than lawmaking. Some deputies have even been detained or assaulted after seeking the removal of a corrupt leader or undertaking a thorough inspection (Xia, p. 138; Cho, p. 93) . Nevertheless, LPC supervision of the government, courts, and procuracy has been growing steadily since the early 1990s and is now considered a top priority, especially for congresses below the provincial level (Cho, pp.
44, 55, 81).
15
Deputies conduct oversight alone and in groups. Between plenary sessions, most members join inspection tours that examine the implementation of laws (Cho pp. 56, 92; Xia, . These are generally arranged by a congress's standing committee and can deposit thousands of deputies in the field (every few months) to see if unlawful fees have been halted, pollution controlled, property rights respected, and compulsory education enforced (Xia, pp. 190, 197, 205; Cho, p. 56) . Reports follow, both to the standing committee and the targeted department, and suggestions are made, some of which are ignored or have little effect. Although inspections can apply pressure on below par cadres and warn others to shape up, one 1994 study of Anhui showed that only about 30 percent of the problems identified were addressed (Cho, p. 57). As they typically not reported, and LPCs lack the expertise to interpret much of the technical material they receive.
23
The two authors differ on how conflictual oversight is. Xia detects a pattern of "cautious confrontation" and deference from standing committee members who, as often as not, live in the same compound as officials they supervise (pp. 226, 245) . Cho see more variation by time and target, with congresses soft-pedaling conflict with governments (until very recently) and adopting an aggressive approach to courts (after ignoring them in the 1980s) (pp. 6, 43, 66, 81-82, 164) . favor that should be repaid by agreeability rather than spirited advocacy of constituent interests. 29 Although representation remains the least developed role of LPCs, deputies do more "opinion reflecting" than they did in the past (Cho, pp. 4-5, chap. 5).
More members speak up for groups or localities (Cho, p. 101), and some try to nudge policy in a desired direction. An influx of younger, better-educated deputies has energized congresses (Xia, pp. 145-49, 244) and many LPCs have evolved into gatherings of the local elite, including outspoken intellectuals and entrepreneurs angling to win government support. 30 whose length and frequency declined from the 1980s to the 1990s, and there is no shortage of "two hands deputies" who only applaud and vote yes, and are little more than sounding boards (Xia, 65, 135) .
The best claim for improved representation lies with members who take it on themselves to do "good things" between sessions.
31
What political scientists call service responsiveness -obtaining benefits for particular constituents -has increased since the 1980s. Many deputies now spend a fair amount of time responding to letters and visits, doing casework, and acting as ombudsmen. This draws them into all sorts of parochial matters, such as raising funds for a poor student, finding a job for a laid-off worker, helping an entrepreneur resist a tax shakedown, springing a constituent's son from labor reform, or resolving a dispute between neighbors. Of late, many congresses have set up hotlines and reception days, and some deputies hold regular meetings with constituents to listen to their opinions. Through these channels, personal complaints are aired and also broader, community-wide concerns. Deputies learn of and convey demands to repair roads and bridges, improve public lavatories, halt hotel construction next to a hazardous materials warehouse, improve restaurant hygiene, relocate bus stops to reduce traffic congestion, and so on. Some deputies also go beyond the needs of a geographic constituency to reflect the views of occupational, gender, or ethnic groups. A school teacher pays attention to building libraries and science exhibition halls, a religious leader seeks to expel army regiments from temples occupied during the 31 Chen, Restructuring Political Power, p. 212. 14 Cultural Revolution, a forester tries to improve education in remote logging camps, a woman looks into day-care availability, a Moslem works to increase non-pork meat supply (Cho, Xia, .
32
Deputies exploit weak electoral ties to address whatever problems draw their interest.
But none of this should be exaggerated. Representation depends on civicminded deputies who assume this responsibility despite few rewards for doing so and few sanctions for ignoring it. There are also risks (Xia, . Members who pursue constituent or group concerns zealously can be accused of neglecting the interests of the whole, divisiveness, or strong-arming officials. Rank-and-file deputies, by and large, continue to represent the Party as much as their constituents and "are more concerned with the survival of the whole regime and the interest of the ruling elite than the people's interest" (Xia, p. 251). This is even more so for legislative leaders: 
33
Deputies are loyalists who uncover social discontent and sound an alarm before an explosion occurs (Cho, p. 95). Without institutional mechanisms to ensure it, representation rests on public-spirited members and leadership forbearance, and, in a fundamentally unrepresentative system, is precarious, inexact, and occasional.
Looking Forward
32
Some of these examples of constituency service and group representation are from O'Brien, " Agents and Remonstrators, 377. 33 On the increasing number of Party secretaries who serve as LPC standing committee chairs, see also Cabestan, "More Power," p. 52; Almen, "Authoritarianism Constrained," pp. 55-57.
Despite their attention to LPC restraint and consensus-seeking (Xia, 251; Cho, , Cho and Xia agree that conflict with other state organs is on the rise. Cho, more cautiously, rates recent legislative development to be evidence only of institutionalization of the polity, not a harbinger of democratization (chap. 8). He argues that congresses will be further upgraded if a democratic transition takes place, but that democratization "generally begins outside legislatures" and legislatures play a small part in it (pp. 169, 172) . (Xia also believes that people's congresses are unlikely to be the driving force behind democratization, but rather vehicles that assist it and benefit from it (p. 256)).
37
For both Cho and Xia, much more than beefed-up LPCs is needed if China is to democratize, including competitive elections, a multiparty system, and well-protected rights (Cho, p. 168, 171; Xia, . This is certainly true, though the real lesson of these books is that we should forgo "democracy or not" questions and be alert to any number of possibilities as China finds its way out of state socialism. Today's leaders do not face a choice between democracy or stagnation, but between different kinds of political reform, some familiar, some less so.
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On the NPC possibly being a meeting ground for reformers and moderate critics to negotiate a transition, see Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking, p. 39; Kevin J. O'Brien, "Hunting for Political Change," China Journal, No. 41 (January 1999), p. 168. Cho (pp. 167, 170) notes that legislatures typically participate in the debates about establishing democracy after authoritarian systems collapse, and is skeptical that Chinese people's congresses "can play even such a limited role." 37 See also Cabestan, "More Power," p. 69.
